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Abstract
We study anti-competitive horizontal mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At
each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge to form a monopoly, trading off
the benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. The potential to merge decreases
pre-merger collusion, as punishments effected by price wars are weakened. We thus extend the
result of Davidson and Deneckere (1984), who analyzed the weakening of punishments post-
merger, demonstrating that pre-merger collusion is weakened, in a fully stochastic model. Thus,
although anti-competitive mergers harm competition ex-post, the implication is that barriers
and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition ex-ante.
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1 Introduction
According to the market power doctrine, the concentration of output among firms in an industry
is a measure of market power in that industry. More market power is synonymous with monopoly:
prices increase and output falls, to the detriment of consumers and to society at large.
The conventional view is that anticompetitive mergers increase industry concentration and hence
increase market power, harm competition ex post, and therefore need to be carefully reviewed and
possibly restricted by regulators. Hence, regulators, such as the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, have the mandate to prevent situations that
“excessively” transfer welfare from consumers to firms via buildups of dominant positions or firms
with disproportionate market power, including mergers perceived to be anticompetitive.
This paper asks whether these policies are desirable or effective. To answer these questions, we
build a dynamic, noisy collusion model that captures firms’ optimal output strategies prior to a
merger. Our model extends Sannikov’s (2007) continuous-time model of tacit collusion, which built
on the discrete-time models of Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986)
In these models firms share a market and choose output levels on an ongoing basis. The firms would
like to collude but neither firm can observe the actions of the other firm. Instead, they observe
price, which is influenced by both firms, but which also is influenced by the noise in demand. As a
result, firms cannot directly infer the action of the rival firm, but instead must indirectly infer it.1
To cleanly identify the effects of anticompetitive mergers, we abstract away from other common
aspects of mergers that can obscure purely anticompetitive effects: these include operational, finan-
cial, or other synergies. Operational synergies can stem from higher growth or lower costs: for exam-
ple, by combining hubs, routes and gate slots, two airlines might be able to operate more efficiently
and reduce costs to consumers. Financial synergies can result from tax savings, increased debt ca-
pacity, or improved returns: for example, by pooling their portfolios of loans, two banks might better
diversify risk and thus be able to offer lower interest rates to mortgage customers. Product mix
synergies can improve as the result of a merger to the benefit of consumers. These synergies would
bias a model in favor of mergers; by eschewing them we build in a bias against mergers. We thus
1In equilibrium, no firm deviates, but it can appear to have deviated, because random demand fluctuations can
lower price. To maintain the equilibrium, the firms must nevertheless punish those apparent deviations by increasing
their output in response.
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focus only on the desire of firms to collude prior to merging or potentially to merge if collusion fails.
The conventional view fails to account for dynamics. Firms in our dynamic model are forward-
looking, aware that they are in a dynamic cartel-like situation, but are unable to directly observe
the actions of the rival firm, which would enable them to enforce the cartel. The inability of each
firm to observe the other firm’s output reflects the real world: regulators punish firms that directly
track and coordinate with each other’s actions for market power purposes.
Because they are blocked from observing each other directly, firms are unable to punish their
rivals for directly perceived deviations from collusion, that is, for producing too much in order to
realize temporarily higher profits at the expense of the other firm. The inability to directly observe
and punish deviations therefore requires a tacit collusion arrangement, in which firms attempt to
observe each other indirectly, via prices. This indirect observation is imperfect, however, because
prices are affected by random influences, in addition to the effects of the firms’ output choices.
Because of the random influences a firm can mistakenly appear to produce too much output,
even though neither firm actually commits such an infraction in equilibrium. Under the tacit collu-
sion arrangement this nevertheless triggers a punishment in which the rival firm increases output,
thus driving down prices and so harming the firm that has apparently deviated: if continued, there
is a price war, resulting in low profits for both firms. It is the fear of this price war that sustains
the tacit collusion arrangement in the long run.
The potential to merge weakens those punishments, because it prematurely terminates them
under terms that are an improvement over the price war for the firm that is being punished. In-
stead of the price war, the deviating firm gets a share in the monopoly that the firms form when
they merge. Because the potential for punishment is concomitantly reduced, the trepidation about
aggressively producing output in contravention of the interests of the cartel arrangement is reduced:
there is more competition, resulting in more output and lower prices.
It is well known that weakening punishments weakens cooperation, which in the present context
means a weakening of collusion. What is not so obvious is that mergers embody such a weakening,
and how to model it; this is our central focus. We reverse the conventional view that mergers are
harmful for society: making mergers more difficult (i.e., costlier for the firms) is actually harmful
to society, because it strengthens the ability of firms to punish each other and enforce the cartel.
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1.1 Related literature
The conclusion that mergers can weaken collusion by reducing the cost of punishment for deviations
has previously been drawn in Davidson and Deneckere (1984) who present a model of horizontal
mergers with tacit collusion. A related effect has been more recently shown in the context of vertical
mergers in Nocke and White (2007) where it is termed the punishment effect.
Davidson and Deneckere’s model is significantly different from our model. They posit that the
merger consists of a post-merger cartel arrangement among firms that remain distinct after merg-
ing; 2 they do not analyze pre-merger play (which would be ill-defined in any case as their model
is deterministic), but only whether a cartel is sustainable ex post of its formation. They consider
two generic situations. In the first situation, all the firms in the industry form a cartel and evenly
split the monopoly profits. In the second situation one of the firms has previously deviated, and
so a full trigger-strategy punishment is imposed: in the first part of the paper they assume that
the punishment phase is that the firms revert to Cournot-Nash collusion, for which total industry
profits are lower than the full-collusion monopoly profits. They then compare the gain if one of
the firms, which can be either an outside firm or the merged firm, because it acts as a single firm,
deviates, with a subsequent permanent trigger-strategy punishment that is, Cournot-Nash profits.
In the “merger” case the merger reduces the number of firms in the industry, and as a result the
Cournot-Nash profits increase, but this has the effect of reducing the relative difference in profits
as the result of the deviation, that is, it constitutes a weakening of the punishment from deviation.
3 We also have a weakening of punishments, but the weakening does not hinge on the number of
firms in the industry. Our analysis focuses on pre-merger behavior, and the effects of the potential
to merge on threats prior to the merger.
The paper of Thijssen (2008), like our paper, studies mergers using a continuous-time structure.
2Intuitively, think of OPEC with member countries inside the cartel, which Davidson-Deneckere would label a
merged entity, and outside non-member countries competing against the cartel.
3Miller, Sheu, and Weinberg (2019) develop a more formal dynamic repeated-game model similar to that of David-
son and Deneckere, and calibrate it to data from the beer industry. They find evidence for collusive monopolisation,
that is, markups exceeding those that would be expected in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. They themselves note
however that because their model is deterministic, punishments will not be exacted in equilibrium, and so are not di-
rectly measurable in the data. They also note that models with noisy observation, punishments might be observable,
mentioning the example of Green and Porter (1984).
There are additional empirical studies with evidence for tacit collusion, including Porter (1983), who finds evidence
for tacit collusion among railway shipping operators in the U.S. in the 19th century, and Knittel and Stango (2003),
who find evidence for tacit collusion by credit card providers.
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There are two firms that have potential gains from merging due to the improvement of diversifi-
cation for the merged firm. Thijssen posits correlation in the profit processes of the firms, leaving
optimization of any production function in the background, and so the model does not have any
pre-merger or pre-acquisition collusion. The central optimization problem facing Thijssen’s firms is
when to merge with or acquire the other firm, which, since the model is couched in continuous-time
terms, reduces to an optimal stopping problem, which in turn is expressed in terms of a boundary.
In an acquisition, one firm hits its relevant boundary first, and then makes an acquisition offer
designed to induce acceptance, given that the acquired firm can refuse. In a merger both firms
hit their boundary simultaneously, and then bargain over the shares of the merged firm that will
be paid to the shareholders of the separate firms. Because the boundaries are endogenous to the
game, the model takes on a real option character. In our model, the ability of the firms to optimize
pre-merger output on an ongoing basis, with the result that that path to the boundary, which is
exogenously given, and also the division of the surplus from the merger, are entirely endogenous,
and moreover, simultaneity also emerges endogenously. The potential exists for a firm to refuse to
merge in our model as well, but, as in Thijssen’s model, this does not happen in equilibrium.
1.2 Technical elements of our model
Our model builds on Sannikov (2007)’s continuous-time model of the tacit-collusion equilibrium of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986), and also on the unobservable action model of Fudenberg,
Levine, and Maskin (1994). The continuous-time approach allows him to express the model in
geometric form, which is far less tractable in discrete time. We assume that firm outputs are
imperfect substitutes, as Sannikov similarly assumed, which we view as adding realism: airlines,
for example, typically have different hubs but overlapping routes on which they compete.4
Our approach to determining the equilibrium differs from Sannikov’s in that we explicitly treat
each firm as a principal in an agency construct, treating the other firm as its agent, with the
continuation-value of the agent as the state variable for the principal; correspondingly, each firm
at the same time behaves as an agent reacting to what is effectively a contract set out by the other
4 Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) for example show in a dynamic model similar in spirit to ours, that if information
arrives continuously and firms are able to react quickly to that information, and also if the key assumption that the
firms’ goods are perfect substitutes is maintained, then collusion breaks down.
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firm. The solution maps out marginal rates of substitution that can then be interpreted as prices or
shadow prices in an equilibrium in which both firms’ contracts are optimal.5 The shadow prices in
the contract internalize the external effect of a firm’s change in output on the other firm’s profits,
enabling the firms to “steer” each other to maintain their ongoing tacit collusion.
The solutions of the agency contracts yield simultaneous differential equations that map out a
one-dimensional manifold in the plane defined by the firms’ continuation values. This manifold,
identified by Sannikov as ∂E , comprises the largest equilibrium set of the game. It is Markovian,
i.e., the movement along the manifold depends only on the current state of the continuation values.
This Markovian property means that the equilibrium state can be mapped one-to-one to the
equilibrium vector of public information that is driven by the output decisions of the firms and by
noise. We begin by treating this information as a state variable for the firms, and we then carry
out a transformation or mapping of this state to the space of continuation values using stochastic
calculus by way of our agency construction. This then maps out the equilibrium manifold ∂E via
Sannikov’s main differential equation (Sannikov (2007), equation (24), p. 1309).
We extend this construction by including additional boundary conditions associated with the
merger. Given the dynamic and stochastic nature of the model, the moment the firms merge is
a stopping time, and we model each firm as independently choosing this stopping time as the
optimal stopping time. Because both firms must choose the same optimal stopping time, there is
a complication that goes beyond standard optimal stopping problems: the firms must somehow
coordinate their stopping times. Characterizing this coordination problem is our central challenge.
We solve the coordination problem by applying a smooth-pasting condition to each firm’s opti-
mal agency problem. In the agency construct, both firms naturally choose the same smooth-pasting
point, and hence the same stopping time, thus solving the simultaneity problem. It is the trans-
formation to the agency construct that enables us to express the smooth-pasting condition. All
of these elements—the manifold, the optimal stopping problem, the differential equations, and the
marginal valuations using the agency construct—are extremely natural within the continuous-time
technical framework, and would not have tractable analogues in discrete time.
5This construct, also known as the planner approach, has a long intellectual history and is an established solution
technique in the dynamic contracting literature; see Miao and Zhang (2015) for a summary of the literature. It also
has a long history in macroeconomics; a recent example is Alvarez and Jermann (2001), who reconstitute a growth
model with defection constraints as a planner problem in which the partner country can defect from the contract.
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1.3 Intuitive elements of the model
To illustrate the pro-competitive effect of mergers, Figure 1 plots the continuation values—the
equilibrium discounted expected present value of profits—of two colluding firms. The continuation
values are in turn influenced by the output quantities. These outputs are highly persistent, that
is, firms never wildly oscillate between extremely high and extremely low output, but rather grad-
ually adjust their outputs in response to the current state as indexed by the current locus of the
equilibrium manifold.
In each panel of Figure 1, the outer manifold is the maximal equilibrium manifold, ∂E , found
by Sannikov in his example of tacit collusion. In an equilibrium, at any moment the continuation
values of the firms lie on a point of the manifold and are perturbed along the manifold by Brownian
shocks. Thus, if one could observe the evolution of the continuation values dynamically, at any
given time the continuation values would be located at a point on the manifold, like a bead on a
wire, and would appear to jitter as if being jostled by invisible particles, exactly as real particles are
jostled by the random motions of molecules in a medium in Brownian motion, but the equilibrium
incentive requirements restrict the jostling to move the bead only along the wire.
The one-dimensional character of the manifolds reflects the mechanics of the punishments the
firms mete out as the demand shocks perturb prices. The firms must punish apparent deviations
of output—chiseling—from the agreed duopoly quantity to sustain the equilibrium, even though
in equilibrium neither firm has deviated. There is only one tool available to the firms to punish
each other: increasing output. As both firms are aware of the apparent deviation, the “offending”
firm must cooperate in its own punishment in order to get back to the good graces of the other
firm. Thus, as the punisher increases output, the offender must decrease output. This results in a
movement along the manifold, which prescribes the direction of movement.6
If the continuation values lie in the northeast part of the manifold, the firms are colluding; they
are producing at reduced rates and are effectively sharing monopoly profits, with some reduction due
to the difficulty of coordination due to the noisy perturbations. If the continuation values lie in the
southwest part of the diagram, the firms are in a price war. At this point both firms are producing
6 The key feature of the equilibrium is that it is optimal for the firms to do this despite its self-destructive nature.
In non-stochastic repeated games it is also optimal to punish oneself as well as the rival player, but in equilibrium this
never happens—it is only a threat. Here, interestingly, the punishments do occasionally take place due to the noise.
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This figure plots the merger equilibrium manifold from Figure 3 and the no-merger equilibrium manifold from
Figure 2; the right hand panel has a plot similar to Figure 3 for the case when the cost of merging is small. The
merger equilibrium manifold is contained entirely within the no-merger equilibrium manifold. The value in the
collusive region of the merger manifold is therefore below the value in the collusive region of the no-merger manifold,
expressing the reduced punishments and reduced competition of the merger manifold.
close to competitive amounts, driving their current profits down. Because the high output state
is long lasting, the continuation values integrate over the resulting long-lasting low profits, whilst
discounting limits the impact of the eventual reversion of the firms to the low-output, collusive state.
In each panel of Figure 1, the inner manifold depicts a merger equilibrium. When the firms
merge they share monopoly profits, with the shares determined endogenously by the locus at which
the manifold intersects the line depicting the monopoly profits attained by merging, less the cost
of merging; in the right hand panel this cost is smaller.
The merger manifold satisfies the same differential equation as the no-merger manifold, but due
to the boundary conditions the entire manifold is affected. Thus, the merger equilibrium manifold
lies entirely inside the no-merger equilibrium manifold, and in the collusive region—the northeast
part of the equilibrium manifold—the merger manifold lies to the southwest of the no-merger man-
ifold, with this difference between the manifolds more clearly visible in the right hand panel of the
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figure. This southwest movement expresses the reduction of the firms’ long run profits associated
with the merger manifold. We will demonstrate that the collusive region is highly stable, so the
figure illustrates how collusion is weakened by the potential to merge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, and Section 3 out-
lines its solution (our main theoretical result). Section 4 derives the model’s implications. Section
5 concludes. The appendices contain derivations, proofs and other technical results.
2 The model
Two firms compete in an industry with differentiated products that are imperfect substitutes by con-
tinuously taking private actions, namely by choosing output levels. Airlines, for example, typically
have different hubs but overlapping routes and correspondingly different intensities of imperfect
product market competition (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu, 2018).
2.1 Actions, prices, information and payoffs
Each firm i = 1, 2 continuously chooses an action—that is, an output level—Ait ∈ Ai ⊂ <+ for all
t ∈ [0, ∞).7 The firms observe the history of a vector of public price signals (i.e., price increments)
dPt, which, because the products are imperfect substitutes, depend on the actions of both firms.
The instantaneous prices of firms 1 and 2 before and after the merger are given by the levels of the
processes:8
dP 1t =
(
Π1 − β1A1t − δ1A2t
)
dt + dζ1t (1)
and
dP 2t =
(
Π2 − δ2A1t − β2A2t
)
dt + dζ2t (2)
7We depart from Sannikov’s assumption that the action set is discrete and finite; we do however, assume bounded-
ness. The boundedness assumption is anodyne in the sense that there is a finite output that maximizes the punishment
of the rival firm by effectively minimizing the excess demand facing the rival.
8 For intuition suppose that price is a deterministic process, with increments dP = P (t)dt. In a continuous time
stochastic setting we add a stochastic process to the process dP and we are restricted to writing the process as dP (t).
8
where ζ1t and ζ
2
t are correlated Brownian demand shock processes. Because we analyze collusion,
we focus only on the case in which the βi and δi are positive constants, reflecting that the goods
in each market are substitutes in the rival’s market. While the potential exists for the goods to be
complements (δi < 0) we don’t examine this case.
2.1.1 Pre-merger information
Before the merger the firms cannot observe the rival’s actions directly; they can learn about each
other’s actions indirectly by observing prices. The noise processes in the model have been con-
structed a priori so that, using the linearity of the prices in equations (1)–(2), the information
processes can be isolated from those observations and expressed as a continuous process with inde-
pendent and identically distributed increments. Thus, before the merger, firms observe a vector of
signals Xt by inverting the price process vector:
dX1t =
(A1t +A
2
t )
2 (Π2 − δ2A1t − β2A2t )
dP 2t −
(A1t −A2t )
2 (Π1 − β1A1t − δ1A2t )
dP 1t = A
1
t dt + σ1 dZ
1
t , (3)
and
dX2t =
(A1t +A
2
t )
2 (Π2 − δ2A1t − β2A2t )
dP 1t −
(A2t −A1t )
2 (Π1 − β1A1t − δ1A2t )
dP 2t = A
2
t dt + σ2 dZ
2
t , (4)
where Zt consists of two independent Brownian motions Z
1
t and Z
2
t ; the ζ
1
t and ζ
2
t processes are
thus generated by reversing the inversion implicit in equations (3) and (4). We provide the details
of the inversion, which is a straightforward matrix algebra operation, in Online Appendix D. The
state space information vector Ω is thus characterized by all possible paths of Xt, and the public
information filtration Ft is generated by Xt.
2.1.2 Payoffs
The instantaneous payoff functions are the product of output and price increments Ai dP i for
i = 1, 2. The expected incremental payoffs of the firms are:
g1
(
A1, A2
)
dt = E
[
A1 dP 1t
]
= A1
(
Π1 − β1A1 − δ1A2
)
dt, (5)
9
and similarly for firm 2. Discounted profits are integrals of these instantaneous profits. We also
note for future reference that the functions gi are by construction continuous and twice continuously
differentiable.
If the action profiles Ait are measurable with respect to the public information filtration Ft
and square-integrable, that is, E
∫∞
0 e
−rt∣∣Ait∣∣2dt <∞, then firm 1’s expected profit will include the
expected value of the stochastic integral
E
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)A1sdζ
1
s
]
The expected value of the stochastic integral is zero, 9 and only the drift terms survive in the profit
calculation. Note that this conclusion holds even though the ζit processes are driven by the actions
Ait (see Online Appendix D), as they are still linear in the underlying Z
i
t processes.
2.2 Post-merger monopoly
We begin our analysis by examining the relatively simple post-merger problem, which will then
help us to derive the boundaries that apply in the more complicated pre-merger game.
When firms merge, they jointly control and observe the actions Ai and can therefore observe
the demand shocks ζi directly. This eliminates their information problem and they can then
choose monopoly outputs and share the monopoly profits available by acting as a single firm. A
straightforward calculation determines the optimal monopoly outputs:
A1
?
=
(δ1 + δ2) Π2 − 2β2 Π1
(δ1 + δ2)2 − 4β1 β2
, A2
?
=
(δ1 + δ2) Π1 − 2β1 Π2
(δ1 + δ2)2 − 4β1 β2
. (6)
These actions are square-integrable, so only the drift terms of the payoff functions survive when
taking the expected value of the monopoly discounted profit, as the stochastic integrals have ex-
pectation zero. The resulting flow payoff function starting from the merger time Tm is then the
9The square integrability condition ensures that the stochastic integral is a martingale; intuitively, the variance
of the stochastic integral is the integral of the square of the integrand and square integrability guarantees that this
integral is finite; see Bjork (2009), chapter 4.
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static monopoly profit
πm = r
∫ ∞
Tm
e−r(s−t)
2∑
i=1
gi
(
A1
?
, A2
?
)
ds =
(δ1 + δ2) Π1 Π2 − β1 Π22 − β2 Π21
(δ1 + δ2)2 − 4β1 β2
, (7)
which will be shared between the firms; we elaborate on the sharing rule below.10
2.2.1 The merger
A merger occurs when the firms simultaneously decide to merge at an equilibrium stopping time,
Tm, via a publicly observable signal Sit from the set {“do not merge,” “agree to merge with share
of the net monopoly profit ξiTm”} such that ξ
i
Tm + ξ
−i
Tm = 1.
The merger entails fixed costs: these can include substantial legal fees that are necessary to
obtain regulatory approval, due diligence measures, the generation of asset valuations, investment
bank fees, and so on. As a practical matter, costly post-merger physical changes can be necessary
as well: when two airlines merge, one of the fleets will need to be repainted. We express these costs
as the one-time merger cost k, which is subtracted from the discounted monopoly profit resulting
from the merger. Firm i’s profit from the merger is therefore
ξiTm(πm − k) . (8)
The potential ongoing profit share combinations, given by ξiTm(πm−k) and (1− ξ
i
Tm)(πm−k), thus
map out a line in value space; this is the red dashed “merger” line depicted in Figure 1.
We emphasize that the sharing rules ξi are endogenous and must be determined in equilibrium;
we do not impose an a priori sharing rule such as equal shares. The stopping time, Tm must be
optimal from the perspective of each firm. Because it is an optimal stopping time there really are
two stopping times, Tm1, and Tm2, one for each firm; it is then a requirement of the equilibrium
that the two stopping times be equal. As with the shares ξi, we emphasize that the stopping times
are endogenous, and we do not impose equality of the stopping times ex ante; in theory, as with
any model, there is the potential that an equilibrium with equal stopping times does not exist.
We demonstrate that equal stopping times are in fact possible and natural because at the
10The integral is discounted profit; pre-multiplying by r converts it into a flow, hence our designation of flow payoff.
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moment of the merger both firms agree on the marginal value of the merger. We express this
explicitly using a smooth pasting argument, but that smooth pasting argument depends on a
reformulation of the model in terms of agency, and we discuss this reformulation below.
In contrast to the output decisions of the firms, at the moment that the smooth pasting condi-
tions determining the merger are satisfied, the announcement of the willingness to merge is publicly
observable. A firm might then decide to publicly refuse to merge in an attempt to extract surplus
from the other firm. The jilted firm might then respond with a punishment for this refusal. For
such a punishment path to work, however, it must itself be an equilibrium: both firms must agree
to follow that path. We discuss the possibility of such alternative paths in Online Appendix K and
also in Online Appendix L. We show that the refusal punishment paths would be suboptimal for
both firms and hence cannot support equilibria in which a firm refuses to merge. For this reason
we focus only on the merger equilibrium.11
2.2.2 Pre-merger payoffs
We assume that Ait is square-integrable; similar to Sannikov (2007), p. 1316, the pre-merger
discounted expected payoff at time t is given by:12
r E
[∫ Tm
t
e−r(s−t)AitdP
i
t
∣∣∣Ft] (9)
The stochastic integral drops out, yielding the expected payoff
r E
[∫ Tm
t
e−r(s−t)Ait
(
Πi − βiAit − δiA−it
)
dt
∣∣∣Ft] (10)
2.2.3 Pre-merger continuation value
With the basic structure of the merger in hand we can state the objective of the firms prior to the
merger. Define the pre-merger continuation value W it (·) as the mapping, W i : <2 → <+, from the
11We emphasize that the nature of the punishment paths associated with the potential refusal of a merger that
we address in the appendix are sharply distinct from the punishments underlying the mechanics of the pre-merger
equilibrium and that are our focus going forward. In the ongoing product market competition game with noisy
observations, pre-merger punishments are effected by changes in output in response to movements in prices.
12 Note that we discount from time t, thus, the integral is the continuation value as of each time t.
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set of state vectors Xt ∈ <2, to firm i’s time t payoff in the continuous-time game.
W i (Xt) = sup
Ai∈H2,T im,ξiTm
E
[
r
∫ T im
t
e−r(s−t)Ais
(
Πi − βiAis − δiA−is
)
ds+ e−r(T
i
m−t)ξiT im
(πm − k)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft, A−i
]
,
(11)
where H2 is the space of square-integrable real-valued functions on the action set Ai ⊂ <+.
2.3 The formal problem and definition of equilibrium
The problem we consider is that of finding the maximal set of payoffs attainable in equilibrium
in the repeated game between the two firms, subject to the constraint that players’ continuation
values can never fall below the merger line. This is because continuing to play the collusion equi-
librium nets the firms more profit than merging due to the fixed cost of merging, insofar as every
equilibrium point above the merger line dominates at least part of the merger line.
At the merger line, the continuation values are by definition equal in the merger and no-merger
states and so the merging does not affect the instantaneous outcome. However the marginal impact
of merging must also be accounted for, and this is expressed as the requirement that the shares
garnered by each firm at the moment of the merger must be locally optimal for each, conditional
on the other firm’s strategy. More formally, we can define the game as follows.
Definition 1 A duopoly Markov merger game is a repeated game with two firms i ∈ {1, 2} and
stage game for every t ∈ [0,∞) that is a tuple
{(Ai)i∈{1,2}, (gi)i∈{1,2}, (P it )i∈{1,2}},
where (Ai)i∈{1,2}, is the space of square-integrable action functions of player i, gi is the instan-
taneous payoff of player i from (5), and (P it )i∈{1,2} is the price process equations (1)–(2) adapted
to the filtration F generated by (ζ1t , ζ2t ) resulting in public information histories as determined by
(3)–(4), with discounted expected payoffs in (9), and in addition a tuple
{T 1m, T 2m, ξ1, ξ2, S1, S2},
such that at any moment t, firms choose a publicly observable signal Sit from the set {“do not
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merge,” “agree to merge”} with shares {ξit, 1 − ξit} and where T 1m and T 2m are the stopping times
defined as the first time the signal Si = “merge” is chosen by firm i.
Thus, a Markov merger game is similar to Sannikov’s game in the run-up to the merger, during
which time the firms can be thought of as sending the “do not merge” signal (or at least one of
them). At the moment of the merger, they both send the “merge” signal along with the choice of
the sharing rule, and the merger takes place, and is irreversible.
We turn now to the definition of equilibrium, which is simply Sannikov’s definition expanded
to encompass the merger stopping time.
Definition 2 A Markov merger game equilibrium consists of:
(i) a profile of public strategies A = (A1, A2) such that Ai maximizes the expected discounted
payoff of player i prior to the merger given the strategy A−i of his opponent after all public
histories. [Sannikov (2007) p. 1292], and in addition,
(ii) firms merge only if both firms simultaneously play “agree to merge” with shares (ξ1Tm , ξ
2
Tm)
such that ξ2Tm + ξ
1
Tm = 1;
(iii) the stopping times T 1m and T 2m are optimal for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively;
(iv) the stopping times are identical, that is T 1m = T 2m = Tm; and
(v) merging does not Pareto-dominate continuation prior to the merger.
It is key that, combined with knowledge of the public history Xt, means that the player i knows
the rival’s recommended action A−it , which is validated in equilibrium. Moreover, we note that,
as with Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), our equilibrium concept is a version of subgame
perfection in that strategies are conditional on histories at every time t; we refer to it as Markovian
due to the existence of a state process, but this requires additional exposition that we provide below.
While the largest equilibrium set is driven by the following sharing rule along the merger line,
W 1Tm +W
2
Tm = (πm − k) (12)
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it is unclear how to ensure that, in equilibrium, the firms agree to merge simultaneously; our defini-
tion does not impose this simultaneity. Our solution procedure transforms the model to characterize
optimality, as is commonly the case with optimal stopping problems, by a smooth-pasting condition
at the potential merger time that holds for both firms. It is then straightforward to show that the
smooth-pasting condition is satisfied simultaneously, resulting in simultaneity of the stopping times.
The fifth item in the definition, concerning Pareto optimality, relates to the special character of
the moment of the merger.13 Specifically, the decision to merge is public, with both firms undertak-
ing the decision to merge simultaneously and at the same moment ceasing their private production
decisions. One might ask on general principle, why don’t firms simply merge at the start of the
game? The answer to this question is evident from examining Figure 1: starting from any point
on the equilibrium manifold that terminates in the merger, merging is not Pareto improving.
This is not true, however, for the no-merger manifold: it extends below the merger line and
from any such lower point there is a selection of points on the merger line that can be attained by
agreeing on a point and merging, with the merger target point somehow determined by a bargaining
solution, such as the one in Thijssen (2008). This in turn destroys the equilibrium character of the
manifold, because the continuation values on the manifold must discount the merger target point
and thus must terminate on that point, contradicting the fact that the merger entails a jump to
that point.14 Thus, any equilibrium must continuously approach the merger line. This in turn
requires that the smooth pasting condition be satisfied (see Online Appendix K).
13It refines the equilibria so as to rule out candidate equilibria that are not our main focus. In Online Appendix L
we establish formally that this refinement directly follows from imposing subgame perfection on the auxiliary game
associated with the announcements to merge or not merge.
14 We expand further on this point in Online Appendix L, where we discuss the auxiliary game in which the firms
announce “do not merge” or “agree to merge” at each instant. We formally analyze the game as a distinct game and
demonstrate that with subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept in this auxiliary game, cooperation is assured,
which in turn leaves firms mutually deciding to merge when the merger is Pareto-enhancing. With this enhanced
equilibrium structure, the no-merger manifold is ruled out as an equilibrium.
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3 Solution
This section discusses the solution to the dynamic game using stochastic calculus, in two stages.
We motivate our approach by first stating an equivalent “planner” or agency problem.15
W i (Xt) = sup
Ait,T im
E
[
r
∫ T im
t
e−r(s−t)gi
(
Ais, A
−i
s
)
ds+ e−r(T
i
m−t)ξiT im
(πm − k)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft, A−i
]
, (13)
subject to
w−i = sup
A−it
E
[
r
∫ T im
t
e−r(s−t)gi
(
A−is , A
i
s
)
ds+ e−r(T
i
m−t)(1− ξiT im)(πm − k)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft, Ai
]
, (14)
where w−i is the promised utility to the rival firm at time t. Notice that the stopping time is chosen
by the “principal,” firm i. There is a symmetric problem for the rival firm −i. 16
One could conventionally solve the principal’s problem using stochastic calculus: state the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the objective (13) with the appropriate state
and solve. What is not so obvious is how to express the rival firm’s promised utility constraint (14)
in stochastic calculus terms.
We take a two-stage approach. In the first stage we solve the maximization problem of the
rival as expressed in (14) using stochastic calculus, treating the public information process Xt as
the state variable for that problem, taking the rival’s action profile as given. The solution of the
rival’s HJB equation can then be substituted into the Ito expansion of the rival’s continuation value
process dW−it ; this process then becomes the state process for the “principal,” firm i in the second
stage of the solution process.
The details of the two-stage solution procedure are as follows.
Stage 1 (i) Solve the conventional profit maximization problem in (14) for each firm, taking the
other firm’s action profile as given, using the public signal vector Xt as the state vector,
thus satisfying incentive compatibility;
15See footnote 5.
16We note that formally, both the action profile Ai is a process conditional on the public information history, and
also that the stopping time Tmi is itself a process, also conditional on the history, and that the optimization is over
these processes. As a practical matter however, the solution of the model ends up using optimal control methods
that pin these processes down at each time t and determine the optimal stopping time via smooth pasting.
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(ii) use the solution of the firm optimization problem to state the continuation-value process
for each firm, W it , in terms of the state vector Xt, that is, promise-keeping;
(iii) demonstrate that simultaneous promise-keeping implies a singular volatility matrix, or
enforcement, restricting the structure of the continuation-value process vector Wt locally
to a one-dimensional manifold in the space of processes adapted to Ft.
The singularity of the volatility matrix is important in two senses. The first is that the con-
tinuation values are restricted to a locally unique direction by the requirement of incentive
compatibility. When a firm punishes the other firm due to a movement in prices, the other
firm must agree to the punishment with a synchronous output adjustment. The result is
that the movement of each firm’s continuation value is restricted to movement in a single
dimension, even though the continuation values occupy a two-dimensional plane. More con-
cretely, a movement of one of the shock processes, say dZ1t , affects both continuation values
via the volatility matrix as is evident in equation (A.4), but in a coordinated way due to the
singularity of the matrix. The singularity of the matrix thus has the mathematical effect of
reducing the dimension of movement of the continuation values locally to a line, and this line
is eventually explicitly characterized by a differential equation. It also expresses the economic
effect of requiring incentive compatibility in the equilibrium.
The second important sense is that it allows us to undertake the later transformation to the
agency formulation because there is then a one-to-one mapping from the state vector Xt to
the continuation value vector Wt that is essential for our agency construction.
Stage 2 (i) Using the single-dimensionality of the enforcement manifold, implicitly map the state
vector Xt into the continuation-value vector Wt using calculus arguments, so that a
firm’s continuation value process W it is implicitly expressed as a function of the rival
firm’s continuation value W−it , i.e. as well as its own continuation value W
i
t , implicitly
construct a mapping M : Xt 7→Wt and noting that M is invertible;
(ii) pose the profit maximization problem for each firm as an agency problem with the rival
firm’s transformed continuation value as the state process;
(iii) solve the principal’s optimal stopping problem using value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions and verify that an optimum is attained;
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(iv) characterize the manifold stemming from the main differential equation implied by the
simultaneous solution of the principal’s problem for both firms, and also the simultaneity
of merger decisions;
(v) verify the equilibrium by noting that the inverse mapping M−1 implies that the firms’
actions are optimal.
The ability to express each firm’s continuation value as a function of the rival’s continuation
value, that is, the agency construction, is key. In that case, the smooth pasting condition
that expresses the marginal value of stopping, is a derivative of the continuation value with
respect to the rival firm’s continuation value. Because the rival firm must similarly satisfy
such a condition, the two smooth pasting conditions are guaranteed to be exactly inversely
related. This is what enables us to establish simultaneity.
Technical details of these steps are in Appendix A. Appendix C relates our approach to Sannikov’s.
3.1 Converting the main differential equation into geometric form
The nonlinearity of the model forces us to resort to numerical solutions. Like Sannikov (2007), we
adopt a reformulation of the second-stage optimized Bellman equations in polar coordinates to fa-
cilitate the computation of numerical solutions in the next section. The details of these derivations,
which were not provided by Sannikov, are presented in Online Appendix E.
We solve the resulting ordinary differential equation system (E.43) numerically to determine
the (benchmark) equilibrium manifold, ∂E(r). If merging is possible, we solve for ∂E(r) subject to
the boundary conditions (i.e., value-matching and smooth-pasting in equations (A.12) and (A.17)),
which are not present in Sannikov (2007). These boundary conditions for the merger will have non-
trivial effects on the firms’ pre-merger strategies and values, which we study in the next section.
3.2 The impact of the merger on the equilibrium set
We next prove that the equilibrium manifold shrinks with the merger cost K, i.e., that the potential
to merge results in a boundary condition that translates into reduced punishments and therefore re-
duced collusion. Denoting the boundary of the equilibrium manifold ∂EKM for the merger model, and
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∂ENM for the no-merger model, we obtain the following result (the proof is in Online Appendix I).
Proposition 1 The Markov merger equilibrium set is strictly contained inside the no-merger Markov
equilibrium set and shrinks with the merger cost K, that is, for K ′ > K,
∂EKM ⊂ ∂EK
′
M ⊂ ∂ENM (15)
The result is illustrated most clearly in Figure 1: the fixed cost of merging is lower in the right
hand panel, and it is apparent that the merger manifold shrinks relative to the high-cost case, with
the key observation that in the low-cost case in the right hand panel, the merger manifold has
moved away from the no-merger manifold.
The fact that the continuation values of both firms in the no-merger equilibrium manifold ex-
ceed the continuation valuations in the collusion region in the merger equilibrium might lead firms
to want to conclude an agreement to never merge.
Corollary 1 Under the conditions given in Definition 2, never merging is not an equilibrium.
Proof: In the no-merger equilibrium the price war region of the equilibrium manifold extends
below the merger line. If the firms attain the price war state then there exists a point on the merger
line entailing monopoly profit shares that make both firms better off relative to the price war. (See
Online Appendix K and Online Appendix L for further discussion.) 
4 Implications
4.1 The no-merger equilibrium
To begin our numerical analysis, we solve for the equilibrium of the benchmark model without
mergers. The benchmark model’s solution to the differential equation (E.43) is characterized by an
equilibrium set, ∂E(r), that forms a manifold in the space of continuation values, (W 1,W 2), as seen
in Figure 2. We assume a baseline environment with symmetric demand functions and the following
parameter values: Π1 = 30, Π2 = 30, β1 = 2, β2 = 2, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.
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17Our symmetric example differs from Sannikov’s (2007) asymmetric example, the parameter values of which are
Π1 = 25, Π2 = 30, β1 = 2, β2 = 2, δ1 = 1, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.5. While the baseline parameter
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The static Nash equilibrium in the duopoly stage game is (5, 5) in the baseline environment. This
generates continuation values of πd,i = 50 for each firm i = 1, 2 (or 100 for both firms).
Figure 2. No-merger equilibrium manifold and
outputs
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This figure plots the no-merger equilibrium manifold (blue, solid line). Firm 2’s output choices are outside the
equilibrium manifold. Due to the symmetric demand functions, we can rotate firm 2’s output choices around the
45 degree line to obtain firm 1’s output choices. The static Nash equilibrium’s output choices of (5,5) are depicted
by N in terms of the continuation values of (50, 50). We use the baseline environment in which Π1 = 30, Π2 = 30,
β1 = 2, β2 = 2, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.
Figure 2 displays the equilibrium manifold in the benchmark case without mergers along with
firm 2’s output choices. Due to the symmetric demand functions, we can rotate firm 2’s output
choices around the 45 degree line to obtain firm 1’s output choices. In the northeast stretch of the
equilibrium manifold the firms cooperate, with output levels around 4 and hence are collusive. On
the opposite side of the equilibrium manifold, that is, in the southwest stretch, they engage in a
choices could be motivated in detail, we omit this for the sake of brevity. The model’s results and implications vary
quantitatively but not qualitatively with parameters.
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price war, in which output levels are around 10 and hence non-collusive.
In the upper right region of ∂E(r) in Figure 2, output is low for both firms in that it sums up
to about 8. That is, the firms approach the monopoly output, which is, according to equations
(6), a?i = 3.75 for each of the two firms (or 7.5 for both firms). Their continuation values are
consequently higher, (around (56,56) at the midpoint of the market-sharing region) than in the
static duopoly’s Nash equilibrium, which corresponds in terms of continuation values to (50, 50),
depicted by N in the figure. The monopoly value of the two firms is πm = 112.5 and is depicted by
the (dotted) monopoly line for all (feasible) sharing rules in the unit interval. Clearly, the monopoly
value is unattainable in either the dynamic or the static duopoly. It is evident that, in this region,
when a firm’s continuation value increases, its market share also increases. Therefore, firms are
tempted to overproduce, moving away from the center of the market-sharing region.
In the upper left segment of ∂E(r) in Figure 2, firm 2 obtains the maximal continuation value
of almost 83, while the continuation value of firm 1 equals about 25. At that point, firm 1 under-
produces, while firm 2 overproduces relative to the duopoly and monopoly quantities. Output is
asymmetric: at the lower right, for example, firm 1’s output is high (i.e., 10) and firm 2’s is low (i.e.,
0). In the lower right segment of the equilibrium manifold, firms thus display similar strategies
with the roles of firm 1 and 2 reversed, namely with firm 1 the incumbent and firm 2 as the entrant.
At the intersection of ∂E(r) with the 45 degree line, firms engage in a price war in that both
firms aggressively overproduce. Their output levels are (10,10) and substantially exceed the (static)
duopoly outputs of (5,5), which leads continuation values to drop well below (25,25).
4.2 The merger equilibrium
We continue our analysis by solving the differential equation (E.43) for the equilibrium manifold,
∂E(r), with mergers by incorporating the boundary conditions for value-matching and smooth-
pasting in equations (A.12) and (A.17). When the merger occurs, both firms share (net of the
merger cost) the value of the resulting monopoly stage game without imperfect information. This
yields the merger line in equation (A.15), which corresponds to the monopoly line, πm, minus the
cost of merging, k, and is represented by the red, dashed line in the figure for all feasible sharing
rules in the unit interval. If firm 1, for example, captures more of the merger gains, then the merger
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point will more likely lie on the lower right section of the line; conversely, if firm 2 captures more
of the gains, then the merger point is more likely to be on the upper left section of the line.
Figure 3. Merger equilibrium manifold and out-
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This figure plots the merger equilibrium manifold (blue, solid line), the monopoly line (black, dotted line), and
the merger line (red, dashed line) for a merger cost of k = 24. Firm 2’s output choices are outside the equilibrium
manifold. Due to the symmetric demand functions, we can rotate firm 2’s output choices around the 45 degree line
to obtain firm 1’s output choices. The static Nash equilibrium’s output choices of (5,5) are depicted by N in terms
of the continuation values of (50, 50). We use the baseline environment in which Π1 = 30, Π2 = 30, β1 = 2, β2 = 2,
δ1 = 2, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.
Figure 3 illustrates how firms anticipate the impending merger. As we demonstrated in Propo-
sition 1 and in our discussion of Figure 1 in the introduction, the equilibrium manifold with mergers
is entirely contained inside the original no-merger equilibrium manifold in Figure 2. This means
that some of the collusion profits attainable in the no-merger equilibrium are not attainable in
the merger equilibrium, while some of the non-collusion costs (due to potential price wars) are
avoided in the merger equilibrium. Intuitively, this stems from the weaker punishments inherent
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in the equilibrium with mergers. The punishments are weaker because the opportunity to merge
eliminates the severe punishments in the price-war regime.
The (upper right) market-sharing region of the equilibrium manifold, which now reflects the
possibility of a merger, is slightly less stretched out in Figure 3 compared with Figure 2. The firms
trade off being the production leader in this noisy duopoly against being punished for deviating. As
in the no-merger equilibrium, total output stays low at around 8, which is again close to the optimal
monopoly output of 7.5. In other words, the market-sharing regime, in which firms’ optimal output
levels are highly collusive, is similarly large relative to one without an anti-competitive merger, as
in the previous figure. Moreover, as the entrant and incumbent regime is approached at the upper
left region, total output increases to 10 and finally to 12 and 13 in the contestability region. But
then total output declines slightly again to 12 just before the merger line is smoothly pasted to the
equilibrium manifold. Thus, compared with the previous figure’s no-merger equilibrium manifold,
total output tends to be lower in the worst stages of the dynamic game.
In practice, merger gains are often split asymmetrically between the merging firms. The model
predicts this: the firm that is being punished in the contestability region gets a smaller share of the
merged entity’s value, because it has a smaller continuation value and hence it appears to be taken
over by the overproducing firm that has a larger continuation value in the contestability region. It is
therefore reasonable to designate them target and acquirer. The firm that overproduces at the right
time will be rewarded by the larger share in the merged entity if the merger boundary is reached.
This asymmetry is not driven by any inherent asymmetry in the demand functions, noise parame-
ters, or other parameters, which are all symmetric: it is driven solely by the state of product market
competition that the firms have attained as a result of cumulative play of the noisy duopoly game.
4.3 Collusion and the dearth of mergers
We next examine the stability of the no-merger and merger equilibria.18 The arrows in Figures
4 and 5 provide information about the stability of the regions. The length of each arrow, which
corresponds to the volatility-scaled drift of the continuation value process represented in equation
(A.4), indicates the strength of stability. The direction of the arrows conveys information about
18Sannikov (2007) studies stability for the partnership example (see his Figure 2), but not for the duopoly example.
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the local stability of each region.
Figure 4. No-Merger equilibrium manifold and
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This figure plots the no-merger equilibrium manifold (blue, solid line). The gray arrows indicate the stability of
the dynamic game, where the length of each arrow is the scaled drift of the value state vector. The static Nash
equilibrium’s output choices of (5,5) are depicted by N in terms of the continuation values of (50, 50). We use the
baseline environment in which Π1 = 30, Π2 = 30, β1 = 2, β2 = 2, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.
We can analyze these stability properties using the agency approach. Because we have expressed
the equilibrium in terms of continuation values, the equilibrium manifold expresses the trade-off
between the continuation value of the principal and the agent from the perspective of each firm in
the implicit agency contract. The slope of the manifold is the shadow price or marginal value of
increasing the continuation value of the rival. One can therefore view the continuation value of the
rival as an “asset” that can be spent or saved at this price.
Continuing with this asset interpretation, the “Stage 2” agency problem for firm i is expressed
in the objective (A.11) with state variable W−i and state process equation (A.10). Examining
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Figure 5. Merger equilibrium manifold and sta-
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This figure plots the merger equilibrium manifold (blue, solid line), the monopoly line (black, dotted line), and the
merger line (red, dashed line) for a merger cost of k = 24. The gray arrows indicate the stability of the dynamic
game, where the length of each arrow is the scaled drift of the value state vector. The static Nash equilibrium’s
output choices of (5,5) are depicted by N in terms of the continuation values of (50, 50). We use the baseline
environment in which Π1 = 30, Π2 = 30, β1 = 2, β2 = 2, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 2, σ1 = 1, σ2 = 1, and r = 1.
(A.10) the “asset” interpretation is evident in the drift function: the state W−i earns “interest” at
rate r, but subtracting “consumption” g−i, that is, the instantaneous profit flow of the rival, and
these profits are reduced by increases in firm i’s output Ai. Thus the first fundamental trade-off
is that firm i implicitly must reward the rival firm −i with an increase in firm −i’s continuation
value if it reduces firm −i’s current profits by increasing output.
There is a second channel that affects its optimum via the term −r(g−i −W−i)W̃ iW−i in the
HJB equation, (A.13): the shadow price—the slope of the equilibrium manifold—is expressed in
the partial derivative W̃ i
W−i ; in the regions of interest, the price war region and the collusion region,
we know this shadow price is negative. This has the effect of reinforcing the trade-off facing firm
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i: by reducing its own output it increases its own continuation value and vice versa.
These trade-offs help to clarify the stability properties of the equilibrium manifold. Consider
Figure 4’s no-merger manifold and focus on the upper part of the collusion region. The arrows in-
dicate that the firms will tend to move to the southeast, that is, toward the center of the collusion
region. Examining the dynamics of the continuation value process vector in equation (A.10), we
see that firm 2’s value state is high, and firm 1’s value state is low. Firm 1 “spends” the asset—the
rival’s continuation value—and reduces its own output, which allows firm 2 to choose high output,
resulting in a negative drift; firm 1, because its current profit is significantly reduced, has positive
drift as it earns “interest;” the result is that both states drift toward the center point of the collu-
sion region. Similarly, to the left of the price war point, firm 1’s continuation value state is again
low. It “saves” by reducing its own output, allowing firm 2’s continuation value to accumulate.
Even though the collusive region is smaller in Figure 5 than in Figure 4, because the option to
merge weakens the punishments that enforce collusion and thus weakens collusion, it remains highly
stable in the merger case. In addition, observe that there are two nodes where the stability flips
between the collusion node and the merger node: the unstable one in the entrant and incumbent
region of the equilibrium manifold, and the additional stable node in the contestability region nearer
the price war or merger node. 19 Comparing the stability diagrams, in both figures the instability of
the contestability region makes it likely that the firms will get back to cooperating if they stray into
this region. In the unlikely event that the cusp in the contestability region is crossed, a price war (or
a merger if there is the potential for it) is unstable, thus making a price war (or a merger) unlikely.20
We can therefore conclude that mergers are rare. This stems from two sources, both the
instability of the merger nodes (which dynamically drives the equilibrium path away from the
node, although not with certainty), and the collusion zone, which is far away from the merger
nodes and which is stable.
19As will be apparent in the simulations of the model, the extra stable node in the contestability region has little
impact on the actual dynamics of the equilibrium.
20However, if the merger state is approached, then in terms of corporate practice, this corresponds to mergers
being “imminent” or “anticipated” just before they are announced. For example, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012) and Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) provide empirical evidence for this anticipation.
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4.3.1 Implications for market power
As we demonstrated in Proposition 1, as the merger cost falls, the equilibrium manifold changes gen-
erally. It flattens, reflecting that the firms are increasingly acting like a shadow monopoly in terms
of output, with the main issue being the equity shares in the merged entity. Outsiders unaware of
the potential for a merger attempting to value the companies would find output choices diminished
relative to the theoretical prediction of the static Nash equilibrium. In addition, regulators would
find greater collusion than would seem warranted by that same benchmark. This collusion will be
strongest when the merger is most remote. For practical purposes, the merger will be a phantom,
seemingly unrelated and hidden from the firms’ current actions. While Andrade, Mitchell, and
Stafford (2001), for example, point out that stronger antitrust laws and stricter enforcement have
provided challenges for anti-competitive mergers, this model’s solution implies that the dearth of
market-power-increasing mergers need not imply more competition in a dynamic duopoly game,
which is designed for the companies to compete.
The dynamic model thus suggests that tests pointing to rejection of the market power doctrine
might be ill-posed: there is not much to deter if the anti-competitive effects of horizontal mergers
are anticipated in merging and rival firms’ product market strategies prior to merger announcements
(or likely challenges by regulators). Consistent with our dynamic model’s insight, Eckbo (1992)
even concludes the following on p. 1005:
While the U.S. has pursued a vigorous antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers over the past
four decades, mergers in Canada have until recently been permitted to take place in a virtually
unrestricted antitrust environment. The absence of an antitrust overhang in Canada presents
an interesting opportunity to test the conjecture that the rigid market share and concentration
criteria of the U.S. policy effectively deters a significant number of potentially collusive mergers.
The effective deterrence hypothesis implies that the probability of a horizontal merger being
anti-competitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S. However, parameters in cross-sectional
regressions reject the market power hypothesis on samples of both U.S. and Canadian mergers.
Judging from the Canadian evidence, there simply isn’t much to deter.
In sum, the model is consistent with several regularities in the mergers and acquisitions literature
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that have heretofore led to rejection of the market power doctrine. The solution suggests an alter-
native interpretation of the literature’s empirical tests. According to our dynamic model with the
possibility of anti-competitive mergers, it is not surprising but rather inevitable that the evidence
for the market power doctrine is weak when using capital market data and short-term announce-
ment return methods to gauge changes in competition (or concentration) that have already taken
place prior to the announcement return window when firms optimize dynamically.
5 Conclusion
We have studied mergers in a dynamic noisy collusion model, building on the models of Green
and Porter (1984), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986), and especially Sannikov (2007). At each
instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge, which trades off benefits of avoiding
price wars against the costs of merging. Mergers are optimal when collusion fails. Long periods
of collusion are likely, because colluding is dynamically stable. Therefore, mergers are rare. Lower
merger costs decrease pre-merger collusion, as punishments by price wars are weakened. This
suggests that, although anti-competitive mergers harm competition ex-post, barriers and costs of
merging due to regulation should potentially be reduced to promote competition ex-ante. We dis-
cuss the welfare implications more fully in Online Appendix J, which makes the case that there is
an unambiguous welfare improvement from the potential to merge.
Our equilibrium solution combines an “agency” approach with a stochastic calculus technical
approach. This method results in an interpretation of equilibrium behavior in terms of shadow
prices that internalize the externalities the firms impose on each other in the duopoly.
We close by noting areas that warrant future research in this class of dynamic models. First,
we have restricted attention to two firms. Extending our analysis to three or more firms would
be informative about the impact of mergers on non-merging rivals as examined in many of the
empirical studies. Moreover, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), for example, show that the
presence of three or more firms in an industry can deter mergers, and that mergers can be welfare-
enhancing, even in the absence of scale economies or synergies. Perry and Porter (1985) examine
this result further with a more fine-grained treatment of the allocation of costs in the merged firm
and moved the conclusion back in the classical direction. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) establish
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that quantity competition in a post-merger industry raises prices if there are no scale economies
or synergies, but still find cases where mergers are deleterious to potential merging firms. Other
researchers, such as Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Gaudet and Salant (1992), analyze welfare
and policy implications in extensions of these models, again finding some counterintuitive results.
The technical challenge in expanding the model to multiple firms is significant, however, in that
equilibrium manifolds would reside in higher-dimensional spaces, with a concomitant increase in
the computational difficulty of numerical solutions.
Second, as we show, the model is related to agency. While we treat firms as black boxes that
are able to hide information, one might reinterpret this as more like a standard agency construct
in which managers hide information from rival firms. With agency explicit, a merger might not
eliminate all information asymmetries: we could ask whether the increase in market power effected
by the merger is strengthened or weakened, and how pre-merger collusion is affected.
Finally, we note that our model does not include costs of production. Costs would vastly compli-
cate the model, for two reasons. First, it would make sense to make those costs privately observable
to each firm, adding an additional source of noise to the information structure of the model. Incor-
porating additional unobservable stochastic cost shocks here would add a signal-extraction element
to the model, because firms would not be able to invert price signals to impute equilibrium ac-
tions as they can here; this in turn would introduce a signal-jamming dimension to the model, and
concomitant additional complexity. We don’t have signal jamming because firms “know” the recom-
mended equilibrium action of the other firm. Second, cost shocks are by their nature private-value
shocks, whilst demand shocks (as in the present structure of the model) are common-value shocks.
This turns out to have major implications for how firms engage in, and react to, signal jamming.
We refer readers to the paper of Bernhardt and Taub (2015) for a detailed treatment of this issue.
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A Detailed derivations of the equilibrium
In this appendix we provide the details of the first and second stages of the solution procedure
outlined in the main text.
A.1 First stage: Deriving the rival’s optimized value process
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the rival’s problem in (14) with the state
process in (3)-(4) is
rW−i = max
A−i
{
r g−i(A
−i, Ai) + A−iW−i
X−i
+ AiW−i
Xi
+ 12σ
2
−iW
−i
X−iX−i
+ 12σ
2
iW
−i
XiXi
}
, (A.1)
where the arguments of W 1 have been suppressed on the right hand side to avoid clutter, and where
the cross-partial terms have dropped out given that the noise terms are uncorrelated.
Invoking our assumption that the action space is a continuum, we can use a conventional
derivative to generate the optimality condition:
r g−iA−i + W
−i
X−i
= 0 . (A.2)
where we have made use of our assumption that gi is differentiable. We also note again that it is
not necessary to know the rival’s policy function before deriving this condition.
We remark that a central assumption is that firm −i cannot observe firm i’s action Ai, yet Ai
appears in the objective. An interpretation of this is as follows. Because the public information state
is observable, in equilibrium each firm takes a “recommended” action Ai, and this recommendation
is known to the rival firm—it is the “agency” aspect of the model. Thus, it is a requirement of
equilibrium that each firm’s conjecture about the rival’s recommended action be correct. 21
We can now characterize the firms’ optimized continuation-value processes:
Lemma 1 The firms’ value states follow the processes
dW−i = r
(
W−i − g−i
)
dt− σ−irg−iA−idZ
−i
t + σiW
−i
Xi
dZit . (A.3)
with a similar equation for firm i.
This is promise-keeping.
21 We explore the equivalence of our stochastic calculus approach with Sannikov’s approach in Appendix C.
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Proof: This follows from substituting the optimality conditions (A.2) and the HJB equation
(A.1) into the Ito expansion of W it . The detailed derivations are provided in Appendix B. 
A.1.1 Enforcement
Combining the continuation value processes for the two firms and denoting the volatility matrix by
Bt yields the vector process:
dWt = r (Wt − g(At))dt +
−σ1rg1A1 σ2W 1X2
σ1W
2
X1 −σ2rg2A2
 dZt
= r (Wt − g(At))dt + Bt dZt .
(A.4)
The volatility matrix Bt contains cross-partial derivatives that we can partially characterize.
Proposition 2 The volatility matrix is singular.
Proof: The optimality conditions (A.2) can be multiplied to yield
r2g1A1g2A2 = W
1
X1W
2
X2 (A.5)
Using the chain rule, we can write
W 1X1 = W
1
W 2W
2
X1 and W
2
X2 = W
2
W 1W
1
X2 (A.6)
and the condition (A.5) can then be written
r2g1A1g2A2 −W 1X1W
2
X2 = r
2g1A1g2A2 −W 1W 2W
2
X1W
2
W 1W
1
X2
= r2g1A1g2A2 −W 2X1W
1
X2 = 0
(A.7)
This is the determinant of the volatility matrix Bt, which is therefore singular as asserted. 
Corollary 2 The continuation value process maps out a one-dimensional manifold.
Proof: The volatility matrix of the continuation value vector process is singular by Proposition
2, so the error process vector is mapped into a single effective stochastic process. Increments to
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this single process are added to the evolution determined by the drift functions, which is along a
one-dimensional manifold. 
The singularity of the volatility matrix is the property of enforcement. It arises from the simul-
taneity of the firms’ satisfying incentive compatibility. 22
In equilibrium the firms react to their signals, altering their output in response to the signal,
which is constantly stochastically perturbed. The resulting actions by both firms push them along
the one-dimensional equilibrium path in the two-dimensional space of continuation values. Sannikov
labeled this set ∂E .
Viewing enforcement as requiring that the firms stay on the equilibrium manifold can be inter-
preted as the operation of a constraint, and the W−i
Xi
elements of the volatility matrix are analogous
to Lagrange multipliers, an interpretation that Sannikov did not provide. (The Lagrange multi-
plier interpretation holds in the additional sense that the multipliers are equal to derivatives with
respect to the state, Xt, as we would expect.) We can interpret the multipliers as shadow prices,
and these shadow prices provide incentives beyond the direct profit incentives in the gi functions:
they internalize the externality that firms have on each other.
The one-dimensionality of the enforced process allows us to carry out a change of variables and
this will further enable our Lagrange multiplier interpretation.
A.2 Second stage: Agency reformulation
In the first stage formulation we generated the first order conditions for each firm, taking the other
firm’s policy rule as fixed. From firm i’s perspective, firm −i’s policy rule can be viewed as a kind
of contract against which firm i chooses its own actions. Knowing this, firm −i wants to choose the
optimal contract. The second stage optimization solves this problem.
A.2.1 Transforming the Xt state to the Wt state
We begin by implicitly mapping the Xt process to the continuation-value process Wt. We use the
the cross-coefficients in the volatility matrix, W 1X2 and W
2
X1 in equation (A.4), to determine the
partial derivatives W 1W 2 and W
2
W 1 . Combining them we obtain slopes of W
1 in terms of W 2 and
vice versa, and thus we obtain W 1 as an implicit function of W 2. This is roughly analogous to
finding the slope of an indifference curve by taking the ratio of the marginal utilities.
Substituting from the optimality condition (A.2) into equation (A.6) results in the transforma-
22We explore the equivalence of our stochastic calculus approach with Sannikov’s approach in Appendix C.
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tions,
W 2X1 = −rW
2
W 1g1A1 = −r
1
W 1
W 2
g1A1 , (A.8)
and, similarly,
W 1X2 = −rW
1
W 2g2A2 . (A.9)
To distinguish this transformed system we use a tilde notation, that is, W it = W̃
i(W−it ) = W
i(Xt),
and similarly ξ̃i(Wt) = ξ
i(Xt), and so on; this approach has the usual abuse of notation in the
sense that W it denotes a process, whilst W
i(Xt) is a function of the process Xt.
A.2.2 The state equation
To formulate the equivalent agency problem we first characterise the state variable process. Nor-
malizing σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1 and σ12 = 0, and eliminating X
1
t as an argument by substituting from
equation (A.8) into equation (A.3), the continuation value process for firm -i in terms of W−it and
W it is:
dW̃−i = r
(
W̃−i − g−i
)
dt − rg−iA−idZ
−i
t + (−r)
1
W̃ i
W−i
giAidZ
i
t . (A.10)
and similarly for firm 1.
A.2.3 The agency contract objective
The second-stage objective for firm i is
W̃ i
(
W̃−it
)
= sup
T im,Ai(·)
E
[
r
∫ T im
t
e−r(s−t)gi
(
Ais, A
−i
s )
)
ds
+ e−r(T
i
m−t)ξ̃i(W̃ iT im
, W̃−iT im
)(πm − k)
∣∣Ft] , (A.11)
with state process (A.10), and with the boundary condition
W̃ i(W̃−iTm) = ξ̃
i(W̃ iT im
,W−iT im
)(πm − k). (A.12)
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and taking as given the other firm’s control process A−i. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
for (A.11) is
0 = max
Ai
{
r(gi−W̃ i)−r(g−i−W̃−i)W̃ iW−i +
1
2
(
−rW̃−i
W 1
giAi
)2
W̃ iW−iW−i +
1
2 (rg−iA−i)
2 W̃ iW−iW−i
}
.
(A.13)
This equation differs from the first-stage HJB equation, equation (A.1). It is however consistent
with (A.1) in that it takes the solution of (A.1) as an implicit constraint.
The optimality condition is
giAi − g−iAiW
i
W−i = 0 (A.14)
Observe that W 1W 2 looks like a Lagrange multiplier on the indirect effect of A
i on firm −i’s payoff;
this expresses the externality. That is, the marginal value of the action on the rival firm’s payoff is
equal to the multiplier. This is where “enforcement” becomes explicit.
We can say a bit more: the “constraint” is the drift of the rival’s continuation value, which can
be “steered” by firm i’s action Ait; the multiplier expresses the shadow price of this constraint. And
with the agency formulation we see that the shadow price is the trade-off between increasing firm
i’s own continuation value W it in terms of firm −i’s continuation value W−it ; it is, as previously
conjectured, the (local) slope of the equilibrium manifold.
A.2.4 The merger boundary
There are two boundary conditions. The first is the trite requirement of no jumps at the merger
boundary. Firm i’s share of the net payoff from merging at time t = T im is given by:
W̃ iTm(W̃
−i
Tm) = (πm − k)− W̃
−i
Tm(W̃
i
Tm) = ξ̃
1(W̃ iTm ,W
−i
Tm)(πm − k). (A.15)
This implicitly defines the endogenous function ξ̃i as a function of W̃ iT im
and W̃−iT im
. Solving for the
share of firm i, ξ̃i, yields:
ξ̃i(W̃ iT im
, W̃−iT im
) = 1−
W̃−iTm(W̃
i
T im
)
πm − k
and therefore ξ̃i
W̃−iTm
= − 1
πm − k
(A.16)
This is the value-matching condition.
The second condition is the smooth-pasting condition. This is found by differentiating the
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boundary function (A.16):
W̃ i
W̃−i
(W̃−iTm) = ξ̃
i
W̃−iTm
(πm − k) = −1 , (A.17)
with a similar condition for firm −i.23 We begin with a lemma about the smooth-pasting condition.
We show that the smooth-pasting condition locally satisfies the second-order condition for the firm
solving the agency problem.
Lemma 2 The smooth-pasting condition is necessary for an optimum with respect to the action
A1.
Proof: See Appendix H. 
We can now address the challenge we posed about the simultaneity of the optimal stopping times.
Proposition 3 The smooth-pasting condition implies equal stopping times: T 1m = T 2m.
Proof: The proof follows from two observations. First, for the value-matching condition to
be met, that is, for the terminal point to be on the merger line, the value-matching condition is
necessarily met for both firms simultaneously. Second, the smooth-pasting condition (in the stage
2 agency formulation) entails the condition
W̃ 1W 2(W̃
2
Tm) = −1, (A.18)
for firm 1; inverting the equation yields
W̃ 2W 1(W̃
1
Tm) = −1, (A.19)
which is the smooth-pasting condition for firm 1. Thus, satisfying the smooth-pasting formula for
firm 1 necessarily satisfies the smooth-pasting formula for firm 2. 
It is worth noting the economic interpretation of the smooth-pasting condition. As the firms
are driven to the merger line by the realizations of the noise, they stay on the equilibrium manifold
by trading current payoffs against future “promise-keeping” payoffs; this trade-off is explicit in the
sense of the shadow price W i
W−i in equation (A.14). The smooth-pasting condition (A.17), which
23We again draw attention to our notation: W̃ 2Tm , viewed by firm 1 as a state variable, denotes firm 2’s continuation
value evaluated at the stopping time Tm, whilst W̃ 1W2(W̃
2
Tm) denotes the partial derivative of firm 1’s continuation
value as a function of that state at the stopping time.
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expresses incentive compatibility at the merger point, reflects—like Sannikov’s (2007) incentive-
compatibility condition (9) in what for us is the pre-merger play—the trading of utility between
the two firms. However, the rate of exchange is fixed by the slope of the merger line. We summarize
with the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The action Ai(·) and W̃ i(·) that solve (A.13), (A.12), and smooth-pasting condition
(A.17), taking as given A−i, solve the optimal action and stopping problem (A.11).
Proof: See Appendix H. 
A.3 Equilibrium and characterization
In an equilibrium of the game, firms must choose optimal contracts in their role as principals,
optimally reacting to the other firm’s contract in their role as agents, and the contracts must be
identical; furthermore, they must agree on an identical stopping time.
We begin with the following definition, adapted from Sannikov (2007):
Definition 3 A set W in the space of continuation values is self-generating if any initial pair of
value processes (W 10 ,W
2
0 ) ∈ W then for every t > 0, (W 1t ,W 2t ) ∈ W and (ii) satisfy enforcement,
that is, they satisfy (A.10).
A manifold in continuation-value space satisfies enforcement, which we only defined previously
in the context of the filtration generated from the Xt process, follows because our mappingM from
Xt to W̃t, implicitly defined in equations (A.8)-(A.9) is invertible. Because enforced paths satisfy
optimality by construction, they are candidate equilibria.
The self-generating manifolds in Sannikov’s non-merger analysis are equilibria of the non-merger
game, because they are closed loops. In our model, the self-generating sets terminate at the merger
line, however they still qualify as self-generating given that the merger point is a terminus. However,
self-generation is not in itself sufficient to determine an equilibrium: it is possible to construct self-
generating manifolds that satisfy the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, but which
lie entirely below the merger line; these manifolds fail as equilibria precisely because both firms
are better off by jumping to the merger line rather than evolve toward it via the self-generating
manifold. We explore this in more detail in Appendix K. Thus, candidate self-generating sets must
lie above the merger line.
Lemma 3 For any manifold that is self-generating, satisfies the value-matching and smooth-pasting
38
conditions, and which lies entirely above the merger line, merging prior to reaching the merger line
does not make both firms better off.
Proof: Because the merger announcement is public, the firms could mutually agree to merge
prior to attaining the merger line, that is, they could agree to jump to some point on the merger
line prior to attaining it via evolution along the manifold. By hypothesis, the manifold lies above
the merger line, so for at least one of the firms the jump to the merger would reduce its continuation
value and it would be not be individually rational to agree to the merger. 
Proposition 5 The self-generating manifold consisting of the value-function processes that solve
(A.13)-(A.17) for both firms simultaneously, such that the resulting manifold lies above the merger
line, constitute a Markov merger equilibrium.
Proof: We first observe that the actions Ait are adapted to Ft by construction. To demonstrate
square integrability, that is, E
∫∞
0 e
−rt 1
2
∣∣Ait∣∣2dt < ∞, it suffices to demonstrate that they are
bounded. The continuation values of the firms along the equilibrium manifold are such that in
punishment mode the punishing firm i exerts a maximum punishment, and this is carried out by
maximizing output Ai; this achieves the minimum continuation value for firm −i. Clearly Ai is
bounded, as the continuation value is positive for the punished firm −i.
We next observe that because they are self-generating, the value function process Wt in (A.10)
maps to the Ft-adapted state process (A.3) that satisfies enforcement. The optimality of the asso-
ciated At process is then implicit. Because the smooth-pasting condition is satisfied, by Proposition
4 an optimum is attained. 
B Derivation of the value process in the first stage
Here is the derivation of Lemma 1.
Proof: We establish the result for firm 1. We first apply Ito’s lemma to W 1(X1t , X
2
t ) in generate
the stochastic continuation value process of the state:
dW 1 =
(
A1W 1X1 +A
2W 1X2 +
1
2σ
2
1W
1
X1X1 +
1
2σ
2
2W
1
X2X2
)
dt + σ1W
1
X1dZ
1
t + σ2W
1
X2dZ
2
t . (B.20)
Notice the resemblance of the terms in the drift to the stage-game payoffs in the Bellman equa-
tion. Substituting equation (A.1) into (B.20) yields a simpler expression for the continuation value
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process:
dW 1 =
(
rW 1(X1, X2)− r g1(A1, A2)
)
dt+ σ1W
1
X1dZ
1
t + σ2W
1
X2dZ
2
t . (B.21)
We further modify this equation by using the optimality condition (A.2) to eliminate the W 1X1
term, replacing W 1X1 with −rg1A1 (i.e., the envelope condition):
dW 1 =
(
rW 1(X1, X2)− r g1(A1, A2)
)
dt− σ1rg1A1dZ1t + σ2W 1X2dZ
2
t . (B.22)
Dropping the arguments, we find that W 1 evolves according to:
dW 1 = r
(
W 1 − g1
)
dt − σ1rg1A1dZ1t + σ2W 1X2dZ
2
t . (B.23)
This eliminates the explicit influence of the state variable X1t from the equation. 
C Connecting our approach to Sannikov’s approach
We explore the equivalence of our approach with Sannikov’s approach here.
C.1 Formulating the model using the history of public information (Sannikov’s
approach)
Our key departure from Sannikov’s formulation is our positing that the public information process
Xt can be treated as a state variable. This approach depends on the assumption that the rival
firm chooses its actions based on the public information state; it is then optimal for the firm to
react to the information state as well. In Sannikov’s formulation, the continuation values are direct
functions of the entire history of the public information process. We can establish informally that
the two approaches lead to the same first order conditions.
Using Sannikov’s approach, define the continuation value process for firm 1 as
dW 1 = (rW 1t − g1(A1t , A2t ))dt+W 1X1dX
1
t +W
2
X2dX
2
t (C.24)
This is simply the differential form of Sannikov’s equation (5) (Sannikov p. 1296), with the structure
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of the drift term accounting for discounting. Substituting from the definition of the Xt process,
g1(A1t , A
2
t )dt+W
1
X1(A
1
tdt+ σ1dZ
1
t ) +W
2
X2(A
2
tdt+ σ2dZ
2
t )
=(g1(A1t , A
2
t ) +W
1
X1A
1
t +W
2
X2A
2
t )dt+ (W
1
X1σ1dZ
1
t +W
2
X2σ2dZ
2
t )
(C.25)
Now substitute into (A.1), that is,
rW 1(X1, X2)dt = max
A1
{
E
[
r g1(A
1, A2) dt+W 1X1A
1
t +W
2
X2A
2
t )dt+W
1
X1(σ1dZ
1
t +W
2
X2σ2dZ
2
t )
]}
(C.26)
the incentive condition is then
r g1A1 + W
1
X1(X
1, X2) = 0 . (C.27)
which is identical to equation (A.2).
We can then substitute from the optimality condition to re-express the drift of W 1, and so in
optimized form equation (C.26) can be written as
dW 1 = r
(
W 1 − g1
)
dt − σ1rg1A1dZ1t + σ2W 1X2dZ
2
t . (C.28)
Compare with equation (6) of Sannikov (2007), p. 1296. Thus, we end up in the same place as
with our state variable approach.
C.2 Connecting the stochastic calculus approach to Sannikov’s martingale rep-
resentation argument
Sannikov develops the “promise-keeping” and “enforcement” arguments using the martingale repre-
sentation theorem. He uses the following discrete-time analogy: in a dynamic programming model
we could write the optimized Bellman equation,
Wt = (1− δ)g(At) + δE[Wt+1(yt)|At]
where Wt is the value function, δ is the discount factor, and so on.
A heuristic way to develop the continuous time stochastic HJB equation is as follows. The
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objective is
V (X0) = max
{At}
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf(At, Xt)dt
]
subject to
dXt = µ(At, Xt)dt+ σ(At, Xt)dZt
We write this in discrete dynamic programming form
V (X0) = E
∫ dt
0
f(Xt, At)dt+ max
a
E
∫ ∞
dt
e−rtf(Xt, At)dt
= E
[
f(Xt, At)dt+ e
−r dtV (Xdt)
]
An algebra step yields:
E
[
e−r dtV (Xdt)
]
− V (X0) = −f(Xt, At)dt
which we can write as
E
[
e−r dtV (Xdt)
]
= V (X0)− f(Xt, At)dt
This is analogous with Sannikov’s unnumbered equation at the top of page 1297, except for the
addition rather than subtraction on the left hand side. However this is an artifact of the different
approach to discounting used by Sannikov: if we treat δ in the usual way, his equation becomes
δE[Wt+1(yt)|At] = Wt − g(At)
The left hand side is
e−r dtV (Xdt) = V (X0) + de
−r dtV
We can now proceed with the Ito expansion of the left hand side, yielding
(
−rV + µ(At, Xt)VX + 12σ(At, Xt)
2VXX
)
dt+ σVXdZt + V (X0) = V (X0)− f(Xt, At)dt
Now we just need to remember that we can substitute from the optimized Bellman equation,
completing the analogy with the Sannikov approach. Specifically, we can draw a more direct
connection with the development of the enforcement matrix B using stochastic calculus, versus
Sannikov’s martingale representation theorem approach.
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C.3 Relationship with Sannikov’s treatment of enforcement
Sannikov’s notion of enforcement is as follows: a volatility matrix B enforces a profile (A1, A2) if it
satisfies incentive compatibility. He expresses this as the instantaneous drift for player i dominating
the drift with an alternative profile, that is,
gi(a) + β
iµ(a) ≥ gi(a′i, a−i) + βiµ((a′i, a−i))
where we recall that µ(A) is the drift of the signal process.
Sannikov then makes a somewhat complicated argument in which he constructs and character-
izes the βi functions. We have employed a more direct approach using stochastic calculus.
This is simply reflecting the optimality requirement: in our case, rather than state an inequality
reflecting optimization, we generate a conventional first order condition. After substituting this
first-order condition and the Bellman equation into the Ito expansion of the continuation value W
we obtain
dW i = r
(
W i − gi
)
dt− σirgiAidZit + σ−iW iX−idZ
−i
t .
The elements corresponding the the µ drift function are σirgiAi and σ−iW
i
X−i . If we look back at
the HJB equation (A.1),
rW 1(X1, X2) = max
A1
{
r g1(A
1, A2) +A1W 1X1 + α
2(X1, X2)W 1X2
+ 12σ
2
1W
1
X1X1 +
1
2σ
2
2W
1
X2X2
}
, (C.29)
we see that the element that is optimized with respect to Ai is
r g1(A
1, A2) +A1W 1X1
which corresponds exactly to Sannkov’s optimization of gi(a) + β
iµ(a), because µ(A) = Ai and
βi = W 1X1 = giAi . Thus, we recover the equivalence of the optimization of the HJB, conditional on
the equilibrium play (optimization) of the rival firm, with Sannkov’s approach.
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